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NO. 53 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Turkey–Russia Partnership in the War 
over Nagorno-Karabakh 
Militarised Peacebuilding with Implications for Conflict Transformation 
Daria Isachenko 
By siding with Azerbaijan in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey is primarily 
pursuing the goal of undermining the current status quo of the region. Ankara aims 
above all to secure a place at the table where a solution to the conflict between Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan will be negotiated in the future. The Syrian scenario should serve 
as an example. Turkey thus wants to negotiate with Russia in the South Caucasus, 
preferably without Western actors. Ankara’s plans are not uninteresting for Moscow. 
However, because of the complexity of Turkish-Armenian relations, there is a risk 
that Armenia and Turkey might become the eventual opponents in this conflict, 
rather than Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU’s engagement should not be determined 
by its tense relationship with Turkey, but rather by the UN Security Council resolu-
tions on Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
‘It’s time to pay.’ With these words, Turkish 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan backed 
Azerbaijan’s demand to Armenia to vacate 
the Azerbaijani territories occupied by 
Armenian troops as well as Nagorno-Kara-
bakh, immediately after the start of the 
military escalation on September 27, 2020. 
Later, Erdoğan vehemently criticised the 
USA, France and Russia who as co-chairs of 
the OSCE Minsk Group mediate in the con-
flict. From the perspective of Azerbaijan 
and Turkey, this format is neither neutral 
nor efficient, as no solution has been found 
for nearly thirty years. Turkey is explicitly 
on Azerbaijan’s side and is prepared to give 
Baku full support ‘both on the field and at 
the negotiating table’. At the same time, it 
has repeatedly stressed its interest in resolv-
ing this conflict together with Russia. 
However, the first consultations took 
place on October 9 in Moscow without 
Ankara. The foreign ministers of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan met alone with their Rus-
sian counterpart. The day before, President 
Vladimir Putin had urged both sides to 
agree to a humanitarian ceasefire. While 
the ceasefire agreement was not observed, 
the message to Ankara was admittedly 
clear: The participants agreed to preserve 
the negotiating format of the Minsk Group. 
On the initiative of the Turkish Presi-
dent, Putin and Erdoğan telephoned on 
October 14 for the first time after the esca-
lation between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
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On this occasion, Putin expressed the hope 
that ‘Turkey, as a member of the OSCE 
Minsk Group, will make a constructive 
contribution to the de-escalation of the con-
flict’. Ankara’s expectation, however, to 
play a leading role in overcoming the con-
frontation is based not only on its role as 
a member of the Minsk Group but also on 
its special relations with Moscow. Will co-
operation between Russia and Turkey in 
the South Caucasus take place as the Turk-
ish side imagines it? 
Turkey’s Interests 
Turkey’s goals in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict are twofold: On the one hand, with 
its support of Azerbaijan, it wants to form 
a counterweight to the supporters of Arme-
nia. From its perspective, these are the three 
leaders of the Minsk Group – the USA, 
France and Russia. On the other hand, Tur-
key wants to consolidate its status as a 
regional power by participating in the nego-
tiation process. 
The fact that Ankara became Baku’s 
closest ally can be attributed in large part to 
the efforts of Azerbaijan. The often-quoted 
statement in Turkey in reference to Azer-
baijan, ‘one nation, two states’, was coined 
by former Azerbaijani President Heydar 
Aliyev in the 1990s. After its separation 
from the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan could 
count on Turkey’s support not only in inte-
gration into international organisations, 
but also in the establishment of its own 
armed forces after the first war over Nagor-
no-Karabakh. The legal framework for Tur-
key’s involvement in the current conflict is 
provided by the Strategic Partnership and 
Mutual Assistance Agreement concluded by 
Ankara and Baku in 2010. In addition to 
joint military exercises, the treaty stipulates 
that the signatories will help each other ‘by 
all possible means’ in the event of ‘aggres-
sion’ by a third party. The impetus for the 
deepening of cooperation between Ankara 
and Baku in the military field was provided 
by similar agreements between Russia and 
Armenia. Already in 2010, the conclusion 
of the partnership agreement between 
Ankara and Baku was seen as a sign of 
Azerbaijan’s dissatisfaction with the 
Minsk Group. 
While Baku, with Ankara’s help, is try-
ing to change the status quo in the conflict 
with Armenia, Turkey’s ambitions go beyond 
Nagorno-Karabakh. In March 2020, Turkish 
Defence Minister Hulusi Akar declared his 
country’s claim to a greater say in the 
Middle East, the Caucasus, the Eastern Medi-
terranean, the Balkans and the Aegean. 
According to Akar, under the leadership 
of Erdoğan, Turkey has become a ‘subject 
in the international arena’. In the South 
Caucasus, Erdoğan is also concerned with 
securing for Turkey the ‘deserved place in 
the world order’ alongside the USA and 
Russia. 
Russia’s Zone of Influence at Risk 
At first glance, the Turkish commitment 
on the part of Azerbaijan presents an un-
expected challenge for Moscow. On the one 
hand, Russia considers the entire South 
Caucasus region as its exclusive zone of in-
fluence. The interference of external actors 
in this region is not acceptable to the Krem-
lin. This is all the more so since the exter-
nal actor is a NATO member that intends to 
establish a military base in Russia’s imme-
diate neighbourhood. On the other hand, 
Russia is not interested in a deterioration 
of its relations with all the parties involved: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
Armenia is considered a formal ally of 
Russia through its membership in the Col-
lective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). 
In the event of a military conflict that 
would affect the territory of Armenia, Rus-
sia would be obliged to involve the CSTO. 
For Moscow, this would mean taking Arme-
nia’s side and taking a stand against Azer-
baijan and thus also against NATO member 
Turkey. Abandoning Armenia is not a viable 
option for Russia either. It is an important 
participant of Moscow’s integration projects 
in the South Caucasus. In addition to the 
CSTO, this includes the Eurasian Economic 
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Union. Last but not least, Russia also main-
tains a military base in the Armenian city 
of Gyumri. 
Although Azerbaijan does not participate 
in Russia’s cooperation initiatives, it is con-
sidered nevertheless a strategic partner for 
Moscow. Moreover, for the Kremlin, Azer-
baijan is a model of how the multi-vector 
policy aspired to by many post-Soviet states 
can function without detriment to Russia. 
In other words, the post-Soviet states’ striv-
ing for an independent foreign policy does 
not necessarily have to end in an anti-
Russian position, as is the case in Georgia 
and Ukraine, for example. 
The risk that the current conflict poses to 
Russia also lies in the destabilisation of the 
region, with serious consequences for the 
North Caucasus. The Kremlin is particularly 
concerned about the presence of foreign 
mercenaries in the South Caucasus. Accord-
ing to reports, combatants ‘from inter-
national terrorist organizations fighting 
in the Middle East, in particular “Jabhat 
al-Nusra”, “Firqat Hamza”, “Sultan Murad” 
and extremist Kurdish groups’ have infil-
trated the region. Thus the creeping expan-
sion of the conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan threatens not only Russia’s zone 
of influence but also its own security in the 
North Caucasus. 
Prospects for Turkey–Russia 
Cooperation in the South Caucasus 
With Ankara’s efforts to get involved in the 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the situa-
tion has become difficult for Russia. None-
theless, Moscow’s and Ankara’s interests are 
converging in several areas, which could 
point to cooperation. For example, Moscow 
works closely with Ankara in Syria. Both 
are keen to pursue regional conflict 
management to the exclusion of Western 
actors. And last but not least, the Kremlin’s 
relationship with the current government 
of Armenia under Prime Minister Nikol 
Pashinyan is problematic. 
The reasons why Moscow is being lenient 
towards Turkey, which after all is interfer-
ing in Russia’s zone of influence, were ex-
plained by the presumed owner of the pri-
vate military enterprise Wagner, Yevgeny 
Prigozhin. In an interview, Prigozhin criti-
cised Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, 
who came to power in 2018 as a result of 
protests. From Russia’s perspective, this 
regime change was the result of a Western-
led colour revolution designed to under-
mine Russia’s influence in Armenia. Moscow 
was in control of the negotiations between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia until Pashinyan 
made a U-turn toward the United States in 
2018. As far as Turkey is concerned, it has 
‘every right to intervene in the Karabakh 
conflict as long as Armenia’s borders are 
not crossed in the process’. If one follows 
this interpretation, the decisive question 
for the Kremlin with regard to Armenia and 
Azerbaijan is how friendly the respective 
governments are to Moscow. In order for 
Russia to be able to preserve its zone of 
influence in South Caucasus, it needs a 
government in Yerevan that sees itself as 
Moscow’s protégé. For Putin, loyalty is im-
portant not only inside Russia but also in 
its near abroad. Therefore, the hard power 
approach of Erdoğan towards Armenia is 
not without benefits for the Kremlin. An-
kara’s interference helps Moscow to regain 
the influence in Armenia that it has lost 
since 2018. At the same time, however, Rus-
sia has drawn a red line to Turkey, namely 
the Armenian territory. 
Furthermore, the Turkish calculation 
to transfer the Syria scenario to the South 
Caucasus is not without a certain logic for 
Russia. It is not only a matter of the quasi-
transfer of the Astana format from Syria to 
Nagorno-Karabakh, but also that coopera-
tion in Syria is too important for both coun-
tries to be put at risk. Regardless of the 
opposing positions, the Syrian factor ties 
Turkey and Russia together. Moscow’s 
concern is to counter regime change both 
in Syria and in Russia itself. Turkey, for its 
part, wants to use the military operations 
in Syria to prevent the emergence of a 
Kurdish state on its border. Cooperation in 
Syria thus touches on the most sensitive 
core issues of both states. It is about their 
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survival. And last but not least, Ankara 
controls the straits that form an important 
gateway for Russia to Syria. 
The results of the Turkey–Russia part-
nership in Syria can already be observed in 
Libya. A main feature of this cooperation 
is the preference for bilateral coordination 
without Western states. Both Russia and 
Turkey are on a course of accelerated 
alienation from the West. Although Turkey 
is not a ‘strategic ally’ for the Kremlin, it 
is still a ‘very close partner’. So if Russia is 
faced with the choice of excluding the United 
States from local conflicts or strengthening 
Turkey as a regional power, the latter op-
tion would be the lesser evil for the Krem-
lin. How quickly Moscow and Ankara can 
reach an agreement in the South Caucasus 
also depends on how successful Armenia’s 
mobilisation strategy in the West would be. 
Hazards of ‘Neo-Ottomanisation’ 
in the Conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh 
At the present, it is hard to imagine that the 
Turkish president would travel to Yerevan 
at the invitation of his Armenian counter-
part to watch the World Cup qualifying 
match of the two national teams together, 
as was the case in 2008. Today, Armenian 
Prime Minister Pashinyan speaks of Turkey’s 
imperialist ambitions that would reach all 
the way to Vienna via Syria, Iraq, the Medi-
terranean and Armenia. The real goal of 
Turkish expansion in the Caucasus, he says, 
is ‘the genocide of the Armenians’. 
Turkey’s interference in the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh has undoubtedly brought 
a new dimension. While Ankara tried 
to initiate stability platforms in the South 
Caucasus in both 2000 and 2008, the cur-
rent effects of a general militarisation of 
Turkish foreign policy are now also being 
felt in this region. In Europe there is talk of 
Turkey no longer as a difficult partner, but 
as a ‘threatening’ one. 
After Syria and the eastern Mediterra-
nean, Nagorno-Karabakh is now also on the 
way to becoming an internationalised con-
flict zone where several regional and global 
rivalries are being fought. However, it is 
primarily a conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. It is about the contested status 
of Nagorno-Karabakh. It is also about the 
seven territories occupied by Armenia, 
whose area is more than twice as large as 
Nagorno-Karabakh itself. There have been 
UN Security Council resolutions on this 
since the 1990s. The EU should not allow 
itself to be influenced by the tense relations 
with Turkey in its possible involvement in 
the settlement of the conflict, but should 
orient itself solely to the requirements of 
international law. 
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